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Abstract
When the issue of speakers’ rights of access arises in media regulation and policy contexts, the focus 
typically is on the concept of speakers’ rights of access “to the media,” or “to the press.”  This right 
usually is premised on the audience’s need for access to diverse sources and content.  In contrast, in many 
non-mediated contexts, the concept of speakers’ rights of access frequently is defined in terms of the 
speaker’s own First Amendment right of access to audiences.  This paper explores the important 
distinctions between these differing interpretations of a speaker’s access rights and argues that the concept 
of a speaker’s right of access to audiences merits a more prominent position in electronic media 
regulation and policy.  This paper then explores the implications of such a shift in perspective for media 
regulation and policy-making.
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Introduction
The concept of access plays a prominent role in electronic media regulation and policy.1  Policies 
ranging from the funding of Internet access for schools and libraries,2 to the cable must-carry rules,3 to 
political campaign communication regulations,4 all are premised to varying degrees on improving access 
for speakers and audiences to the mechanisms necessary to engage in the communication process.  
Although such access policies have been implemented on behalf of a variety of social, political, and 
economic goals, it is important to recognize that access policies also often have a significant First 
Amendment component.  That is, access policies as they pertain to the media frequently are premised, at 
least in part, on the notion that the First Amendment guarantees both speakers and audiences sufficient 
access to the components of the communication process necessary to facilitate the free flow of ideas and 
information that is essential to both individual liberty and to the effective functioning of the democratic 
process.5
Policymakers and the courts have tended, however, to conceptualize access rights – and their 
underlying rationales – differently in electronic-mediated and non-electronic-mediated contexts.  
Specifically, the tradition of a speaker’s First Amendment right of access to an audience that is prominent
in non-mediated contexts has not factored as significantly in mediated communication contexts.  In 
mediated contexts, the concept of access to audiences has been supplanted as a policy priority by the 
1 See generally Andrew D. Auerbach, Mandatory Access and the Information Infrastructure, 3 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 1 (1995); Philip M. Napoli, Access and Fundamental Principles in Communication Policy, 2002 L. 
REV. M.S.U./D.C.L. 1 (2002).
2 Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d. 401 (E.D. Pa.) (three-judge court), rev'd, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) 
(plurality). See also Mark N. Cooper, Inequality in the Digital Society: Why the Digital Divide Deserves all the 
Attention it Gets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 73.
3 See Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
4
 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).  See also CBS v. Federal Communications Commission, 435 U.S. 367 (1981).
5
 As the Supreme Court noted in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, “decisions involving corporations in the 
business of communication or entertainment are based not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering 
4similar, albeit (as this paper will argue) significantly different, concept of access to the media, or to the 
press.  This right of access to the media typically has been premised upon different First Amendment 
values than the right of access to audiences.  Specifically, the right of access to the media has been 
premised primarily upon “collectivist” First Amendment values such as enhancing the democratic process 
and preventing abuses of governmental power, whereas the right of access to audiences has been 
premised primarily upon more “individualist” values such as the preservation and promotion of individual 
liberty and autonomy.6
This paper will explore this distinction between the right of access to an audience and the right of 
access to the media, and the implications of this distinction for media regulation and policy.  This paper 
will argue that the right of access to audiences that is prominent and well-established in non-mediated 
speech contexts should receive comparable prominence in mediated contexts, and that this access right 
should be premised on the same individualist First Amendment values as it is in non-mediated contexts. 
This paper will then explore what such a shift in priorities might mean for electronic media policymaking.
The first section of this paper outlines the contours of a speaker’s First Amendment right of 
access to audiences.  As this section will demonstrate, the concept of the right of access to audiences has 
been developed most extensively within the context of the “public forum doctrine,” which addresses 
speakers’ rights of access to public spaces, and is premised primarily upon the individual liberties that the 
First Amendment protects.  The second section traces speaker access rights as a policy priority in the 
mediated context.  As this section will demonstrate, the concept of speaker access to audiences never has 
attained comparable prominence in mediated contexts.  Instead, as a review of significant access policies 
individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the 
dissemination of information and ideas,” 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
6 A collectivist approach to the First Amendment is one in which the role of the First Amendment in enhancing the 
speech environment for the community is given priority; whereas an individualist approach is one in which the role 
of the First Amendment in preserving and promoting individual liberties is given priority (though these approaches 
need not be completely mutually exclusive.  For a thorough discussion of individualist versus collectivist First 
Amendment values, see Philip M. Napoli, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS 
IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Ch. 3 (2001).
5and court decisions will illustrate, the predominant access right that policymakers, policy advocates, and 
the courts have recognized is one of a right of access “to the media.”  This access “right” typically is 
premised primarily upon the First Amendment rights of audiences to diverse sources of information, and 
the collective benefits that such access provides, rather than upon First Amendment access rights that the 
speaker possesses, and the individual liberties that such access protects and supports.  The third section 
examines the important applicational distinctions between the right of access to the media and the right of 
access to audiences.  As this section will illustrate, a right of access to audiences is both a more nuanced
and a more complex standard to apply to speakers’ access rights than a right of access to the media.  The 
fourth section argues that the right of access to audiences merits much greater prominence in policy and 
legal decision making pertaining to the media in light of the intended functions of the First Amendment.  
The final section explores the implications of a shift in analytical perspective from emphasizing a 
speaker’s right of access to the media to emphasizing a speaker’s right of access to audiences for media 
regulation and policy.  As this section will illustrate, such a shift would require that policymakers focus 
greater attention on the dynamics of media content distribution and consumption.  Such a shift also 
potentially would strengthen access policies against judicial scrutiny, as well as potentially strengthen the 
rhetorical stances of the public interest/advocacy community on a wide range of electronic media policy 
issues.  
The First Amendment Right of Access to Audiences
The First Amendment right of freedom of speech traditionally has included a right to a certain – if 
not particularly well-defined – level of access to audiences.  According to Emerson, our “system of 
freedom of expression . . . demands access to an audience.”7   In Kovacs v. Cooper, the Supreme Court, 
in deciding a case involving an ordinance limiting the use of sound amplification equipment, noted that: 
“The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and 
to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.  This is the phase of freedom of speech that is 
6involved here.”8   This passage carves out the right of access to an audience (expressed in terms of the 
opportunity to reach the minds of listeners) as a distinct component – or, to use the Court’s words –
“phase” of First Amendment rights.  As the Court’s statement indicates, free speech not only is a function 
of the extent to which citizens can say what they want, but also a function of the extent to which their 
speech has the potential to reach an audience.  In the context of mediated communication, this right of 
access to audiences can be thought of in terms of a right that extends beyond the right of “publication,” 
encompassing also the right to “circulate” or “distribute” ideas or information.9  The exact parameters of 
this right to circulate or distribute speech are, however, not entirely clear.10
The notion of a First Amendment right of access to audiences has been developed most explicitly
within the context of judicial decisions pertaining to access to public forums, such as streets and town 
squares.11 A public forum generally is a public place where people traditionally gather to express ideas 
and engage in discourse.12  In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization the Supreme Court
articulated the basic tenets of the public forum doctrine.13  At the core of the public forum doctrine is the 
ideal that “[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public … have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
7
 Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 14 GA. L. REV. 795, 808 (1981).
8
 366 U.S. 77 (1949).
9
 As the Supreme Court noted in Ex parte Jackson, the “liberty of circulating is as essential to [freedom of the press] 
as it is to the liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value,” 96 U.S. 
727, 733 (1877). Similarly, in a decision finding a town ordinance prohibiting the distribution, without a permit, of 
circulars, handbooks, or other literature unconstitutional, the Supreme Court specifically noted that “The ordinance 
cannot be saved because it relates to distribution and not to publication. . . . [It is] held invalid because of its direct
tendency to restrict circulation.” Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). See also Michael A. Pavlick, 
No News is Good News? The Constitutionality of a Newsrack Ban, 40 CASE W. RES. 451, 452-456 (1990).
10
 See Pavlick, supra note 9. 
11 See,  e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Hague v. Committee for Industrial 
Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); see Noah. D. Zatz, Sidewalks in 
Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149 (1998).
12
 The phrase “public forum” emerged from a 1965 article by Harry Kalven; see Harry Kalven, The Concept of the 
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1. For a critique of the public forum analytical framework, see 
Daniel A. Farber and John E Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in 
First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984).
13
 307 U.S. 496 (1939).  
7citizens, and discussing public questions.”14   Justice Roberts emphasized that “[s]uch use of the streets 
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of 
citizens.”15 Furthermore, “[t]he privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for 
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, 
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in 
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or 
denied.”16  Thus, individual speech liberties must be balanced with the public interest.  As the Court noted 
in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, “[I]n the light of the First Amendment, … to preserve access to 
public places for purposes of free speech, the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved 
have remained important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the Amendment to the 
speech in question.”17  Thus, the nature and character of the public place is essential to identifying the 
limits of government regulation of speech in a location, and thus the speaker’s ability to reach such an 
audience.
Fundamental to the public forum doctrine is the notion that the First Amendment ensures that 
both speakers and audiences have reasonable access to the communication process.  A key function of 
public forums is to provide access to an audience that the speaker may not otherwise be able to reach
effectively.18  As Zatz notes, “One of the most basic functions of the public forum doctrine is to provide 
speakers mass access to the general public.”19
In many public forum cases, the central issue typically involves whether speakers are granted 
sufficient access to those locations where they have the greatest opportunity to reach audiences.  
Consequently, time, place, or manner restrictions often are at the core of many public forum cases.   
14 Id. at 515 (Justice Roberts’ opinion [plurality]).
15 Id.
16 Id at 515-16 (Justice Roberts’ opinion in which Justice Black concurred).
17 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), at 302-03.
18 See Zatz, supra note 11 at 161.
19 Id. at 201.
8While content-based restrictions of speech presumptively violate the First Amendment, the government 
may regulate the time, manner, and place of speech as long as a substantial state interest exists. 
Restrictions on the time, place, or manner of exercising First Amendment rights are constitutional if they 
pass a three prong test20 in which: (1) the restrictions are content-neutral; (2) they serve a significant 
government interest; and (3) there are “ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”21
As this third prong of the time, place or manner test suggests, restrictions imposed on speech 
must allow for sufficient alternative opportunities for speakers to access their desired audience.  It has, 
however, been noted that “the Court has never clearly defined the alternate means test.”22  As a result, two 
interpretations of the alternate means test have developed. 23  The first test requires only that the speaker 
have some viable alternative for communicating his or her message, regardless of whether that option is 
public or private.24 Under this interpretation, the speaker may be required to incur additional costs or 
inconveniences associated with pursuing these alternate means of expression.25
The second interpretation of the alternative means test requires that the speaker have alternative 
access to his or her chosen public forum at some time or place.26  This approach considers the alternative 
channels left open within the public forum, not the alternatives available elsewhere.  This is obviously the 
more stringent interpretation of the test, in that it allows for a more limited range of alternative 
communication channels than the other interpretation.  Such an approach reflects the possibility that, in 
some instances, a message’s effectiveness depends upon it being delivered at a particular time or place –
20 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
21 Id. at 177.
22
 Pavlick, supra note 9 at 483.
23 Id.
24 See Harold L. Quadras, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic Interest, The Fall of 
Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439, 449 (1986).
25
 Pavlick, supra note 9 at 484-485. For a critique of this approach, see William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little 
People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 757, 762-771 (1986).
26 See Providence Journal Co. v. City of Newport, 655 F.Supp. 107, 118 (D.R.I. 1987).
9often in order to reach a particular audience – a consideration that becomes relevant to the extent to which 
an individual speaker is able to effectively exercise his or her First Amendment rights.27
Obviously, these different interpretive approaches to the alternative means test hinge very much 
on the question of the level of access to audiences to which the speaker is entitled. There are a number of 
cases that help illustrate variations in the judiciary’s analytical process in this regard. In International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness and Brian Rumbaugh v. Walter Lee,28  the Court denied the 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness the right to perform rituals (as part of their fund raising 
process) within Port Authority of New York and New Jersey airports.  The Court concluded that the 
Society had sufficient access to audiences if they were to conduct their activities on the sidewalks outside 
the airports (permissible under Port Authority rules).  In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that 
“This sidewalk area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport users . . . no more than 3% of 
air travelers passing through the terminals are doing so on interterminal flights . . ..  Thus the resulting 
access of those who would solicit the general public is quite complete.”29  Here, then, the extent of access 
to an audience facilitated by alternative means is actually quantified, and then used to determine whether 
a First Amendment violation has taken place.30 Given the fact that, under the alternative access plan, 
speakers would be denied access to, at most, three percent of the audience they were seeking to reach, the 
Court concluded that there was no First Amendment violation of a magnitude to overcome the compelling 
government interests in the safe and efficient operation of airports.31
Similarly, in Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, the Court upheld a shopping mall’s restriction against 
the distribution of handbills on the premises in p art because “[a]ll persons who enter or leave the private 
27
 In an effort to bring greater consistency to the application of the alternative means test, Lee proposes an analysis 
that considers the following three factors: a) cost; b) ability to reach the intended audience; and c) the 
communicator’s autonomy from gatekeepers. See Lee, supra note 25, at 809-810.
28
 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 680 (holding that an airport terminal was a nonpublic forum for First Amendment purposes and that the 
prohibition on solicitation activities was reasonable). 
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areas within the complex must cross public streets and sidewalks, either on foot or in automobiles. When 
moving to and from the privately owned parking lots, automobiles are required to come to a complete 
stop.”32  Therefore, “[h]andbills may be distributed conveniently to pedestrians and also to occupants of 
automobiles, from these public sidewalks and streets.”33  Here again, the extent to which comparable 
alternative means of accessing the desired audience were available was central to the analysis.
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,34 the Court utilized a similar 
analysis to reach a different conclusion.  In this case, the Court found that a shopping center’s ban against 
picketers in the center’s parking lot was a violation of the picketers’ First Amendment rights, as the 
alternative locations available for the picketers (surrounding streets and sidewalks) were judged to not 
provide sufficient access to the audience that the picketers were trying to reach (customers of a 
supermarket located within the shopping center).  The Court raised the concern that, if the picketers were 
placed on the surrounding streets and sidewalks, “the placards bearing the message which petitioners seek 
to communicate to patrons must be read by those to whom they are directed either at a distance so great as 
to render them virtually indecipherable . . . or while the prospective reader is moving by car.”35  Neither 
alternative was judged by the Court to grant the petitioners sufficient access to their desired audience to 
fulfill their First Amendment rights.  This decision also illustrates the important point that such access 
rights have been – and can be – granted to privately-owned facilities.36
As the Amalgamated case indicates, in some instances, audience access decisions have revolved 
around access to a very specific audience.  In Amalgamated, access to the supermarket customers in 
particular was key to the fulfillment of the picketers’ First Amendment rights.  Along similar lines, the 
32
 Lloyd Corporation, 407 U.S. 551 at 566-567.
33
 Id. at 567.  See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483-484 (1988), (upholding  an ordinance forbidding 
picketing an individual residence on the basis of the conclusion that ample alternative means of communication 
were available).
34
 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
35 Id. at 322
36 See also March v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), (granting a Jehovah’s Witness the right to distribute literature 
on the sidewalks of a town completely owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation). 
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United States District Court overturned a University of Virginia regulation that prevented students from 
constructing a mock shanty town in front of the University’s Rotunda in order to call the attention of the 
university’s Board of Visitors to the plight of South Africans suffering under apartheid.37   The court’s 
decision was based on the judgment that alternative venues (i.e., other locations on campus) for 
constructing the shanty town did not provide adequate alternative means of communication because these 
alternative venues were not in sufficient proximity to areas of campus frequented by the Board of 
Visitors.  According to the court, “The option of building shanties on spots invisible from the Rotunda 
eliminates the students’ ability to win the attention of the Board of Visitors and is thereby an inadequate 
alternative outlet for the pla intiff’s expressive conduct.”38  The court went on to say that the university’s 
suggestion that the mail and other forms of media offer ample alternative channels for communication 
neglects the fact that “these options involve more cost and less autonomy than the shanties, are less likely 
to reach the Board of Visitors who may not deliberately be seeking information about apartheid, and 
might be less effective for delivering the message that is conveyed by the sight of a shanty in front of the 
Rotunda.”39  This statement is particularly significant as it articulates a wide range of factors (cost,
autonomy, persuasive impact) that can be incorporated into the assessment of whether sufficient 
alternative means of accessing a specific audience are available.
Reflecting this breadth of relevant factors to consider in terms of whether sufficient access to 
audiences has been granted, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a city 
ordinance banning the use of signs attached to sticks or poles was unconstitutional because it limited 
access to audience members in crowded contexts such as marches or parades.40  In such contexts, “where 
individual voices cannot be heard above the din, and ‘dramatic performances’ and hand-held signs are 
easily swallowed up by the crowd . . . [s]igns attached to supports such as poles or sticks are effective 
37
 Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. Robert M. O’Neil, 660 F.Supp. 333, 339 (1987).
38 Id. at 339-340.
39 Id. at 340.
40
 Edwards v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 262 F.3d 856 (Ct. App. 9th Cir., 2001).
12
tools by which to overcome the communication problems endemic to these types of situations.  A sign 
that can be hoisted high in the air projects a message above the heads of the crowd to reach spectators, 
passersby, and television cameras stationed a good distance away.”41  For these reasons, the court 
concluded that the ordinance did not allow for ample alternative means of communication, as it limited 
the audience reach of individuals participating in crowded demonstrations or parades.42  This decision 
would seem to suggest that proximity to the potential audience is not necessarily sufficient for meeting 
the First Amendment’s access to audiences criterion.  Some consideration for the mechanisms for 
communicating, and the ability to amplify one’s message is appropriate as well.43
It is important to emphasize, however, that these issues of time, place, or manner restrictions –
and thus the issue of a speaker’s right of access to an audience, are not confined exclusively to public 
forum cases, 44 and in some of these cases the issue of alternative means of accessing an audience is 
central. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,45 the Supreme Court upheld a zoning restriction on adult 
theaters, based in large part on the judgment that sufficient alternative avenues of communication were 
available.  As the Court noted, the ordinance leaves some 520 acres, or more than five percent of the 
entire land area of Renton, open to use as adult theater sites.”46  It was, however, this question of 
sufficient alternative avenues of communication that was at the core of the dissent of Justices Brennan 
and Marshall, who argued that much of the 520 acres cited above was already occupied, and therefore not 
realistically available to theater owners.47
41 Id. at 867.
42
 Id.
43 See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77 (1949), (overturning a ban on sound amplification equipment for similar 
reasons.  Here again, the Court granted speakers a right to a means to project their message in order to reach a larger 
audience). 
44 See U. S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public 
Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-536 (1980).
45
 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
46 Id. at 53.
47
 Id. at 64.
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The right to door-to-door solicitation has been upheld in part on the basis of a First Amendment 
right of access to audiences, and the doorway of a private residence never has been classified as a public 
forum.  In Martin v. City of Struthers,48 the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a Jehovah’s 
Witness for violating a city statute forbidding door-to-door distribution of literature.  The Court noted that 
the right to approach homes and offer discussion or literature was “in accordance with the best tradition of 
free discussion.”49  This right to approach and offer information,50 then, is premised in large part upon 
speakers having a right of access to an audience.  In upholding a speaker’s right to knock on a stranger’s 
front door in order to present ideas (ideas that the resident may even be hostile to),51 the Court upheld a 
fairly powerful First Amendment right of access to an audience.52
In the examples discussed in this section, the courts’ analyses have revolved around the role of 
the First Amendment in protecting individual liberty (i.e., the freedom to convey one’s ideas to others), 
not around alternative First Amendment values such as the value to the citizenry of being exposed to – or 
having the opportunity to be exposed to – the information that these speakers were providing.  In this 
regard, these access to audiences decisions fall squarely in the traditional “individualist” interpretation of 
First Amendment rights,53 where the liberty and autonomy of the individual speaker are paramount (even 
to the extent that the speaker has the right to annoy people by knocking on their doors while they are at 
home).  This perspective is well-illustrated by Justice Reed’s statement in Kovacs v. Cooper, that free 
speech guarantees “every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must 
48
 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
49 Id. at 144-145.
50 See Darrin A. Hostetler, Face-to-Face with the First Amendment: Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network and the Right 
to “Approach and Offer” in Abortion Clinic Protests, 50 STAN. L. REV. 179 (1997).
51
 “A debate can not be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide open’ if speakers can speak only to those who request that 
they do so,” Note: The Impermeable Life: Unsolicited Communications in the Marketplace of Ideas, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1314, 1317 (2005).
52 See also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (an ordinance 
prohibiting door-to-door or on-street solicitation of contributions was held unconstitutional; the regulation was 
overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
53 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); R.H. 
Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994). 
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be opportunity.”54 In this regard, then, a speech environment in which there is ample opportunity for the 
citizenry to exercise their First Amendment right of access to audiences must be maintained.
First Amendment Right of Access to Media
When we examine the issue of speaker access in the realm of electronic media, we generally find 
that the concept of speaker access to audiences described above is much less prominent.  Instead much 
more focus has been placed – by policymakers, policy advocates, and the courts – on the concept of 
speaker access to the media, or to the press.  In the transition to an increasingly mediated communications 
environment, and as a response to the distinguishing characteristics of the electronic media environment, 
the specific characteristics of a speaker’s access rights seem to have undergone a subtle but significant 
change.  
A useful introduction to this notion of a speaker’s right of access to the media is provided in the 
work of Jerome Barron.55  According to Barron, the evolution of our communications environment from 
one of individual street corner speakers and pamphleteers to one of corporate-controlled mass media 
outlets necessitates a reconsideration of how to conceptualize and apply the First Amendment.  
Specifically, the contemporary media environment brings unprecedented levels of inequality to the extent 
to which different speakers have the opportunity to have their voices heard.  And, according to Barron, as 
the media industries grow more concentrated, fewer and fewer individuals control the flow of information 
to the public.  To counteract these processes, Barron argues for an affirmative right of access to the 
media, such that individuals or viewpoints that might not otherwise be heard can be heard.
In developing this argument, Barron draws support from judicial decisions in the public forum 
area that have articulated a speaker’s right of access to audiences.56  According to Barron, the migration 
of this access principle from the public forum realm to the mass media realm is a logical transition.  As he 
argues, “The influence of the privately-owned mass media on the information and opinion process is too 
54 Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77 at 87.
55
 Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press – A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARVARD L. REV 1641(1967).
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great for an access-oriented first amendment theory to be halted in its tracks because the monopoly 
newspaper, for example is privately rather than publicly owned.”57  Barron’s ultimate hope is for the 
construction of “a public forum model . . . within the context of privately owned mass media.”58
It is important to note that Barron advocated a right of individual speakers to media outlets owned 
and operated by other individuals or organizations.  In this regard, this access right, as originally 
conceived, was “micro” rather than “macro” in its orientation.  That is, the proposed access right focused 
on granting some individuals access to other individuals’ media outlets, rather than on crafting a media 
system or speech environment in which access to the media was more widely disseminated (i.e., in which 
ownership was more diversified).  As such, Barron’s access policy proposal was more behavioral than 
structural, in that it was in fact a reaction against specific structural changes (i.e., ownership 
concentration) that had begun to affect the mass media.
A key detail of Barron’s argument is that as he transfers the public forum principles into the 
realm of the mass media, he employs a slight shift in terminology.  Specifically, he abandons the right of 
access to audiences language that is central to the public forum decisions and adopts instead language that 
focuses on the right of “access to the media,”59 or, in some cases, a right of “access to the press.”60  This is 
a subtle but important distinction, for instead of advocating a direct right of access to audiences, Barron is 
advocating a more indirect process, wherein speakers are granted a right of access to particular 
institutions (the media) in order to then (presumably) achieve access to audiences.
This issue of a right of access to the media has found its way into the Supreme Court’s decision 
making on a number of occasions – though the right of access to the media has been both affirmed and 
rejected by the Court, depending upon the particular media technology at issue.  In perhaps one of the 
56 See Jerome A. Barron, An Emerging Right of Access to the Media? 37 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (1969).
57 Id. at 492.
58 Id. at 506.
59 See supra note 56 (throughout).
60 Id.
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most well known media access cases, Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission,61
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FCC’s political editorial and personal attack rules 
(components of the Fairness Doctrine62), which required broadcasters to provide political candidates with 
an opportunity to respond on-air to broadcast editorials against their candidacy, or other forms of 
criticism.  This decision was premised in large part upon what were deemed to be the unique 
characteristics of the broadcast medium – specifically, the scarcity of available spectrum.  
The Court reached similar conclusions in CBS v. Federal Communications Commission,63
upholding an FCC regulation requiring that political candidates receive “reasonable access to . . . the use 
of a broadcasting station.”64  As the Court noted, the FCC’s reasonable access rule created a new “right of 
reasonable access to the use of stations,”65 a right which the Court concluded did not intrude significantly 
upon broadcasters’ First Amendment rights in light of the compelling government interest in providing 
citizens with access to political campaign messages.
However, in Miami Herald v. Tornillo,66 the Court rejected a similar access right in the context of 
newspapers as an infringement upon newspaper publishers’ First Amendment rights.  In this case, 
granting an unaffiliated speaker the right to respond to a newspaper story within the pages of the paper 
was deemed an infringement on the First Amendment rights of the newspaper publisher.  These different 
outcomes help illustrate how the different technological characteristics of the individual media have 
factored into the extent to which speakers have a right of access to them, with the most pronounced right 
of access to the media being found in the electronic media context.
61
 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
62 The Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to provide diverse perspectives on controversial issues of public 
importance.  For detailed discussions of the Fairness Doctrine, see Handling of Public issues under the Fairness 
Doctrine and the public interest standards of the Communications Act (Fairness Report), 48 F.C.C. 2d 1; Inquiry 
into section 73.1910 of the Commission's rules and regulations concerning the general Fairness Doctrine obligations 
of broadcast licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d 145. See also Timothy J. Brennan, The Fairness Doctrine as Public Policy, 33 
J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 419 (1989); Mark A. Conrad, The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A 
Blow for Citizen Access, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 161 (1989).
63
 435 U.S. 367 (1981).
64 Id. at 377.
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In each of these cases, the focal point of the access advocates’ arguments, and of the Court’s 
analysis, is the speaker’s right of access to the particular media outlets.  This is particularly well 
illustrated by the repeated use of the terminology “access to the press” in the Miami Herald decision67 and 
the repeated use of the terminology “access to broadcast stations” in the CBS decision.68  Nowhere in 
these decisions do we find any explicit identification of a speaker’s First Amendment right of access to 
audiences of the sort that we find in many access decisions in non-mediated contexts.69
Certainly, implicit in this notion of a right of access to the media is the assumption that such 
access simultaneously grants sufficient access to audiences.  Consider, for instance, that although Barron 
never explicitly argues for a speaker’s First Amendment right of access to audiences, the concept of 
access to audiences is implicit in much of his argument.  When he argues that “[a]n analysis of the first 
amendment must be tailored to the context in which ideas are or seek to be aired,” he emphasizes the need 
for assessing the relative “impact” of different media.70  Similarly, he emphasizes the importance of 
considering which media are most “important,” “dominant,” and “significant.”71  All of these somewhat 
ambiguous terms are given a bit more clarity when Barron argues that “[i]f ideas are criticized in one 
forum the most adequate response is in the same forum since it is most likely to reach the same 
audience.”72  Thus, implicit in Barron’s medium-specific approach is the idea that the extent to which 
different media provide access to different audiences must be considered when implementing access 
rights.  However, the explicit access right being argued is that of a right of access to the media, rather than 
the right of access to audiences.
65 Id. at 381.
66




69 See supra notes 43-49.
70 Supra note 55 at 1653
71 Id. at 1651.
72 Id. at 1653.
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Perhaps more significant than this shift in terminology is the accompanying shift in underlying 
First Amendment rationales.  Specifically, unlike the right of access to audiences described above, the 
right of access to the media has not been premised primarily upon preserving and promoting the liberties 
and autonomy of the individual speaker.  Instead, a speaker’s right of access to the media has been 
premised primarily upon the benefits that accrue to the public (i.e., the audience) from having access to a 
diversity of sources of information.73  Thus, while the right of access to an audience, as it has developed 
in non-mediated communication contexts, is firmly based upon the traditional “individualist” 
interpretation of the First Amendment, the right of access to the media is not.  Instead, the right of access 
to the media is primarily premised upon the rights, needs, and interests of the collective citizenry.  
Such a justification also is grounded in First Amendment theory.  There is a long line of legal 
philosophy and scholarship articulating an interpretation of the First Amendment that places the speech 
needs of the collective citizenry ahead of the needs of the individual speaker.74  Those theories of the First 
Amendment that emphasize free speech’s contribution to the spread of knowledge, or to the effective 
functioning of the democratic process, or to the protection of the citizenry from abuses of governmental 
power, all have at their core a more “collectivist” interpretation of the First Amendment.75
This collectivist interpretation of the First Amendment is central to the Red Lion decision, in 
which the Court noted that “the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their 
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First 
Amendment. . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, 
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.”76  Note in this passage how, in a decision that 
73
 As Owen Fiss notes, the concept of a right of access to the media “does not seek to protect the self-expressive 
interests of an individual citizen seeking access, but rather it is intended to further a collective goal: the production 
of robust public debates.” See Owen Fiss, Building a Free Press, In RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO THE MEDIA (ANDRAS 
SAJO AND MONROE PRICE, eds.) at 99 (1996).
74 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure,  71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986); FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE 
SPEECH (1996); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1972). 
75 See Napoli, supra note 6.
76 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367, 390.
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grants certain speakers (in this case politicians) access to the media, the only articulated First Amendment 
right is the audience’s right of access to “social, political, esthetic, morel and other ideas and 
experiences.”77  Indeed, nowhere in the decision does the Court argue that the politicians who have been 
granted a right of access to the media have been granted such access on the basis of their individual First 
Amendment rights.  
Similarly, in justifying its decision in the CBS case, the Court drew heavily upon its decision in 
Red Lion, noting again that “It is the right of the public to receive suitable access….”78  Moreover, the 
Court noted that the reasonable access provisions make “a significant contribution to freedom of 
expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information 
necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process.”79  Again, an access right is being granted 
primarily on behalf of collective benefits (in this case, the effective operation of the democratic process), 
not on behalf of preserving and promoting the liberties and autonomy of the individual speaker.
Even advocates of a speaker’s right of access to the media have relied upon this same interpretive 
stance.  Consider, for instance, that, in his initial articulation of a right of access to the media, Barron 
justifies this access right on the grounds of producing a better-informed citizenry and in terms of 
preserving “public order.”80  Both of these functions of First Amendment rights have been categorized as 
belonging to the “collectivist” bundle of First Amendment functions, given that the benefits accrue to the 
community as a whole.81  Thus, audiences are the primary beneficiaries of a vigorous First Amendment in 
this context.  Nowhere in his piece does Barron develop an argument that the First Amendment rights of 
speakers, in particular, are being abridged by the changes in technology, distribution, and ownership 
affecting the system of communication in this country.  Such an argument could have been particularly 
compelling in the (pre-Internet) era in which Barron was writing, when information dissemination via the 
77 Id.
78 See CBS, 435 U.S. 367 at 728 (citations omitted).
79 Id. at 729.
80 Supra note 55 at 1648-1649.
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electronic media truly was dominated by relatively few sources, and the distribution of individual rights 
of access to the media was significantly inequitable.82
Similarly, when Barron and others argued for a right of access to the print media in Miami 
Herald, they argued “that government has an obligation to ensure that a wide variety of views reach the 
public,”83 an argument that reflects the philosophy that “diversity of ideas . . . is the primary objective of 
the first amendment”84 and again prioritizes collectivist First Amendment values over individualist First 
Amendment values.  Thus, somewhat ironically, when the courts, policymakers, and policy advocates,
speak of a right of access to the media, they typically are not actually talking primarily about an 
individual’s First Amendment right of access to the media; rather, they are talking about a right of access 
to the media that has been granted to the individual in the name of the First Amendment rights of the 
community/audience as a whole.
Distinctions between Access to Audiences and Access to the Media
On the surface, it may seem that the concepts of access to audiences and access to the media 
basically are synonymous.  This is not the case, particularly in the highly complex, fragmented, and 
increasingly consolidated media environment of today.85  Indeed, just 30 years in the past it may have 
been easier to assume congruence of the concepts of access to the media and access to audiences, given 
that 30 years ago we were still very much in an era of true “mass” media, in which there were far fewer 
content options, each of which could be better guaranteed large, heterogeneous audiences than they can 
81 See Napoli, supra note 6.
82
 Today, as will be discussed, access to the media is more widely disseminated (thanks in large part to the advent of 
the Internet), but access to audiences remains highly imbalanced.
83 See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241, 247-248.
84 See Barron, supra note 56 at 498.
85 See generally James. N. Horwood, Public, Educational, and Governmental Access on Cable Television: A Model 
to Assure Reasonable Access to the Information Superhighway for All People in Fulfillment of the First Amendment 
Guarantee of Free Speech, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1413 (1995).
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today.86 At that point in time, it seems reasonable to presume that there was greater equivalence in the 
audience reach potential of those with access to the media than there is today.
Certainly, gaining access to the media is central to the process of gaining access to audiences; 
however, there are other factors at work that ultimately affect the level of access to audiences that a 
mediated communicator enjoys.  Access to the media is, for the most part a binary concept (either one has 
access to a media outlet or one does not), whereas the extent to which a speaker possesses access to an 
audience is a matter of degree, with the degree of access a function of a variety of factors, including the 
technological characteristics of the medium, the system of content distribution, and audience awareness 
and availability.  Thus, for instance, a cable network placed at channel 110 on a cable system does not 
have the same degree of access to audiences as a network placed at channel 12, due not only to the fact 
that many audience members likely don’t subscribe to a channel package that includes all upper-tier 
channels, but also due to the fact that demonstrated patterns of the typical individual’s media consumption 
indicate that channels located further up the dial are less likely to be accessed by the typical viewer.87
Similarly, a web site does not have the same level of access to the typical audience member in a 
particular media market as a broadcast station/network, due not only to the lower levels of Internet 
penetration relative to television penetration, but also due to factors such as the lower level of audience 
awareness that the web site is likely to have in a media environment that is much more fragmented than 
what exists in the television context, which reduces the likelihood of audience exposure to the site.88
86 This phenomenon relates to the concepts of media fragmentation (fragmenting of media outlets) and audience 
fragmentation (fragmentation of audience attention.  For a discussion of media and audience fragmentation, see 
PHILIP M. NAPOLI, AUDIENCE ECONOMICS: MEDIA INSTITUTIONS AND THE AUDIENCE MARKETPLACE (2003). For a 
discussion of the increasing challenges that the contemporary communications environment poses for speakers 
attempting to access audiences, see generally Note: The Impermeable Life, supra note 51.
87 See generally JAMES G. WEBSTER AND PATRICIA F. PHALEN, THE MASS AUDIENCE: REDISCOVERING THE 
DOMINANT MODEL (1997).
88
 Of course, from a global standpoint, the web site’s audience access may be greater, but as the examples of the 
application of the alternative means of communication test discussed previously indicated, it often is necessary to 
take into consideration the specific audience that a speaker is trying to reach.  Thus, even today, for television 
broadcasters the Internet does not represent a viable alternative to the broadcast spectrum for reaching their desired 
audience, otherwise these broadcasters would have abandoned the broadcast spectrum, with all of the onerous 
government regulations associated with it, for webcasting.  This has not happened, suggesting that the Internet does 
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Similarly, when we focus solely on the Web, individual web sites are not equivalent in their levels of 
access to audiences due to factors such as variations in placement by search engine listings and linkages 
and cross-promotional arrangements with other web sites.89  Ironically, as the research of political 
scientist Matthew Hindman90 shows, in the web environment, where equality in the level of access to the 
particular medium is greater than has ever been achieved in traditional media, the level of access to 
audiences afforded to those with access to the medium appears to be at its most unequal.  Hindman 
reaches this conclusion on the basis of data showing the enormous disparity across web sites in terms 
their quantity of “incoming links” (i.e., the number of other sites linking to a particular site),91 and on the 
basis of data showing that audience attention is, in fact, more heavily concentrated around a select few 
speakers in the on-line media realm than it is in the off-line media realm.92 Such findings suggest vast 
differences in the level of access to audiences available to speakers on-line, though, as economist Bruce 
Owen has noted, it is often difficult to effectively distinguish between “access” and “success.”93
Access variations can exist across individual content types as well.  For instance, policymakers 
traditionally have valued broadcast programming produced within local markets and/or addressing local 
issues and concerns (e.g., local public affairs programming).94  Unfortunately, when programmers have 
provided such programming, economic incentives frequently have led them to air such programming in 
very poor time slots (with the quality of the time slot defined in terms of the size of the available 
not yet represent a sufficiently effective alternative means of reaching the audiences sought by broadcast stations or 
networks.
89
 Andrew Chin, Making the World Wide Web Safe for Democracy: A Medium-Specific First Amendment Analysis.
19 HASTINGS COMMUNICATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 309 (1997).
90 See Matthew Hindman, A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep: Measuring Media Diversity Online and Offline, In MEDIA 
DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS (PHILIP M. NAPOLI, ed.) (in press); “Googlearchy”: How a 
Few Heavily Linked Sites Dominate Politics Online, unpublished manuscript (2003).
91 See Hindman, “Googlearchy,” supra note 90.
92 See Hindman, A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep, supra note 90.
93 See Bruce M. Owen, Confusing Success with Access: “Correctly” Measuring Concentration of Ownership and 
Control in Mass Media and Online Services. Stanford Law School, John Olin Program in Law & Economics 
Working Paper 284, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=545302 (accessed January 1, 2005).
94 See Broadcast Localism. Notice of Inquiry, 19 FCC Rcd. 12425 (2004).
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audience).95  It perhaps goes without saying that the producers of such programming are not enjoying the 
same level of access to audiences as the producers of programming that is aired in prime time.  A program 
that airs at dawn on Sunday does not have the same level of access to an audience as a program that airs at 
8:00 P.M.96
Policymakers, have, in certain instances, been sensitive to such disconnects between the concept 
of access to the media and the concept of access to the audiences.  Consider, for instance, the now-defunct 
Prime-Time Access Rule, which prohibited broadcast networks from offering programming to their 
affiliates during the first hour of prime-time (7:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. EST), in order to make this time slot 
and, most importantly, the large audiences accompanying this time slot, available to independent program 
producers, thereby expanding the range of content providers with access to large audiences.97  The time 
slot specificity of PTAR represents the recognition that mere access to the media may not be sufficient for 
certain policy objectives.  Additional steps may need to be taken to ensure adequate access to audiences.98
Similarly, the FCC’s “reasonable access” provision, which grants political candidates access to broadcast 
facilities,99 includes a requirement that broadcasters provide candidates with access during prime time,100
in recognition of the fact that politicians will achieve their greatest level of access to audiences during this 
time period, when HUT (households using television) levels generally are at their highest.  As the FCC 
95
 Philip M. Napoli, Market Conditions and Public Affairs Programming: Implications for Digital Television Policy.
6 HARV. INT’L J. OF PRESS/POLITICS 15 (2001).
96 See Fiss, supra note 73 at 9 for a similar point. As Fiss notes, “[a]ccess to a radio or television station or 
newspaper is provided only as a way of affording access to the public, and any access regulation should be judged 
accordingly.  That explains why so-called public access channels on cable T.V. – allowing the citizen to appear on 
camera at 3:00 AM – are inadequate.  Such appearances play no more role in public deliberations than having a 
book deep in the stacks of a university library.”
97
 Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, 11 FCC Rcd 546 (1995)
98
 It is worth noting, however, that regardless of the extent to which PTAR helps to illustrate the distinction between 
access to the media and access to audiences, PTAR, like many media access policies, was premised and justified 
primarily on the basis of the rights of the audience to access to diverse sources, rather than upon the basis of the 
rights of speakers to access to audiences. Id.
99 See supra note 4.
100
 Licensee Responsibility under Amendments to the Communications Act Made by the Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 516, 516-517 (1974).
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noted, “Such a refusal would deny the candidates access to the time periods with the greatest audience 
potential.”101
More recently, in describing its efforts to craft a Diversity Index to facilitate the formulation of 
effective media ownership regulations, the Federal Communications Commission noted that, “we retain 
our emphasis on . . . ensuring that viewpoint proponents have opportunities to reach the 
citizen/viewer/listener.”102  Clearly, this statement reflects a concern with facilitating speakers’ access to 
audiences.  However, the Commission’s perceived failure to adequately reflect this concern in its 
Diversity Index methodology was a key reason the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded 
the Commission’s ownership decision.103  As the court noted in its extensive criticism of the Diversity 
Index, “Not all voices, however, speak with the same volume,”104 a statement that clearly reflects the 
notion that access to the media and access to audiences are far from synonymous – and, perhaps most 
important – should not be treated as such from a policymaking and policy analysis standpoint.
These examples are meant to illustrate the distinction between the concept of access to the media 
and the concept of access to audiences, not necessarily to serve as specific examples of First Amendment 
access problems requiring some sort of policy remedy.  In each of these cases, speakers with comparable 
access to the media have very different levels of access to audiences.  Treating the concept of access to 
the media as synonymous with the concept of access to audiences is therefore inappropriate and 
represents a dramatic simplification of the access to audiences concept.
Necessity of a Right of Access to Audiences to Media Policy 
One certainly could question whether the notion of a speaker’s First Amendment right of access 
to audiences is necessary or appropriate in the realm of media regulation and policy.  In terms of 
101 Id. at 517.
102 See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 
13620 (2003).
103
 Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications Commission, 373 F. 3d 372 (C.A. 3rd Cir. 2004).  The 
court took particular issue with the Commission’s decision not to weight the importance of individual media outlets 
in accordance with either their potential or actual audience reach.
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necessity, one could argue that the access to the media concept is sufficient, and that any deeper analysis
simply tells us nothing other than the distribution of media consumers’ preferences.105 Such a 
perspective, however, completely ignores the important dynamics of the relationships between media 
ownership and distribution structure and the dynamics of media consumption that should be at the core of 
policymakers’ analytical concerns.  In this regard, the concept of a right of access to audiences is 
particularly vital to analyzing the regulatory and policy issues emerging in the contemporary media 
environment.  The contemporary media environment is one in which, on the one hand, ownership of the 
most prominent media outlets is becoming increasingly concentrated and in which, despite the increasing 
array of available content options, the majority of audience attention remains focused on a narrow range 
of content providers.106  On the other hand, new communications technologies such as the Internet raise 
the possibility of individual speakers having access to global audiences.  In such an environment, the 
issue of speaker access to audiences seems increasingly central to determining whether existing policies 
are effectively serving the underlying principles of the First Amendment.  In an environment in which the 
definition of a media content provider has essentially expanded from a complex organization to also 
encompassing an individual in his home office with a PC, and in which the technological characteristics 
of the media increasingly facilitate access to audiences across local, national, and international 
boundaries,107 the question of who does and who does not have access to the media seems increasingly 
insufficient for analyzing the extent to which the values inherent in the First Amendment are being 
pursued and protected to their fullest extent.  Instead, a more rigorous standard is required.
104 Id. at 408.
105 See Owen, supra note 93.
106 See James G. Webster and Shu-Fang Lin, The Internet Audience: Web Use as Mass Behavior, 46 J. OF 
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 1 (2002).
107 See Philip M. Napoli, The Localism Principle Under Stress, 2 INFO 573 (2000).
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Balkin develops this idea in his discussion of the promotion of a “democratic culture” as the 
central purpose of free speech.108  According to Balkin, “a democratic culture is a culture in which 
individuals have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as
individuals.”109  Moreover, the defining characteristics of the contemporary media environment (see 
above) are central to the achievement of this democratic culture, and therefore must be a point of focus 
for policymakers.  To the extent that an effective democratic culture relies upon “ordinary people 
[participating] freely in the spread of ideas and in the creation of meanings that constitute them and the 
communities and subcommunities to which they belong,”110 an emphasis on broadly distributing the right 
of access to audiences becomes a central policy priority.  Such an approach extends naturally from a well-
established First Amendment “norm of broad distribution of expressive opportunities.”111  This norm is 
reflected in policies and legal decisions ranging from universal telecommunications service policies,112 to 
“compelled carriage” policies such as cable must-carry113 and the Fairness Doctrine,114 to the public 
forum cases discussed previously.115  The common underlying rationales for these policies (and the 
judicial support they have received ) are that the First Amendment’s linkage to the democratic process 
108
 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information 
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004). 
109 Id.
110 Id. at 4.
111
 Molly Shaffer Van Houwelling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1535, 1559 (2005).  This 
notion of a broad distribution of expressive opportunities is reflected in a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit involving efforts by a government official to purchase all copies of a newspaper depicting him in 
a negative light.  The court found that such actions infringed upon the First Amendment rights of the publisher 
because the First Amendment protects “a speaker’s right to communicate information and ideas to a broad 
audience.” Kenneth C. Rossignol vs. Richard J. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 522 (2003) (emphasis added).
112
 The Federal Communications Commission operates subsidy programs in which taxes collected on 
telecommunications services are redistributed to low income households (for telephone service) and to schools and 
libraries (for Internet access) to facilitate connectivity for those individuals and organizations who might not 
otherwise be able to afford network connections.  Such policies are based in part on increasing the extent to which 
the full range of the citizenry has opportunities to both disseminate and access information.  See In the Matter of 
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 FCC Rcd 8776 (1997).  See also Mark N. Cooper, Why the 
Digital Divide Deserves all the Attention it Gets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 109-15 (2002); Heather E. 
Hudson, Universal Access: What Have We Learned from the E-Rate?, 28 TELECOM. POLICY 309 (2004).
113
 The must-carry rules mandate that cable systems carry local broadcast station signals.  These rules are motivated 
in part by the desire to maximize the range of information sources available to the citizenry. See Turner 
Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
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requires a distribution of speech rights that mirrors the one-person-one-vote approach to the distribution 
of political influence in a democracy, and that, to the extent that free speech is intended to facilitate the 
search for truth, or at least to facilitate better-informed decision-making, the widest possible 
dissemination of diverse viewpoints is essential.116  This perspective towards the First Amendment is 
particularly important, as it highlights the notion of access to audiences becoming an affirmative policy 
goal (i.e., the promotion of equitable audience access across the citizenry in order to maximize the extent 
to which the citizenry’s First Amendment rights as speakers are being fulfilled) as opposed to simply a 
mechanism for defending against possible intrusions (in the form of private or public policies) on the 
speech rights of individual speakers.
Another relevant component of Balkin’s argument is that he does not see the changing 
technological environment (and the increased opportunities for communication that it provides) as a
sufficient mechanism for satisfying policymakers’ free speech objectives, but rather as establishing a set 
of conditions to which policymakers must respond in order to maximize the extent to which contemporary 
conditions reach their potential to serve and promote a democratic culture.117  In this regard, maximizing 
the equitable distribution of the right of access to audiences remains a policy priority even in the face of 
technological developments that would seem to inherently promote such distribution.118  Such an 
114 See supra note 62.
115 See supra notes 11-43.
116 See Van Houwelling, supra note 111 at 1547-49. See also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV., 354, 377-78 (1999).
117
 According to Balkin, “The digital age provides a technological infrastructure that greatly expands the possibilities 
for individual participation in the growth and spread of culture and thus greatly expands the possibilities for the 
realization of a truly democratic culture” (emphasis added).  To achieve these possibilities, however, “free speech 
values – interactivity, mass participation, and the ability to modify and transform culture – must be protected 
through technological design and through administrative and legislative regulation of technology, as well as through 
the more traditional method of judicial creation and recognition of constitutional rights,” Id. at 6.  This position 
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Communications Commission, in which the very presence of a more expansive and robust technological landscape 
is seen as absolving policymakers of their responsibility for monitoring – and reacting to – conditions in the 
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are being facilitated by these new technological developments. See id. at 14-24.  See also Steve Mitra, The Death of 
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approach reflects the fact that media policymakers’ perspective on the First Amendment should be one in 
which they are concerned with the extent to which the contemporary media environment is reaching its 
full potential to serve the values inherent in the First Amendment, as opposed to one in which the 
contemporary media environment is being assessed against some past period in media history.
Implications for Media Policy
It has been argued to this point that the concept of speaker access to audiences has been largely 
supplanted in media contexts as a policy objective to be promoted and protected with the concept of 
speaker access to the media.  However, as described above, the concept of speaker access to the media is 
less nuanced than the concept of speaker access to audiences.  Consequently, a greater emphasis on 
speaker access to audiences is necessary and appropriate when considering the role of the First 
Amendment in electronic media regulation and policy issues.  This section explores what such a shift 
would mean for electronic media regulation and policy, particularly in relation to structural media policy 
issues, which inherently involve the “allocation of speech entitlements.”119  It is important to emphasize 
that this section does not provide a fully developed system for applying the right of access to audiences to 
media policy issues.  To do so is a complex task that is beyond the scope of this paper.  This section does, 
however, attempt to provide a starting point for deeper and more extensive explorations of the role of the 
First Amendment right of access to audiences in media regulation and policy by examining those cases in 
which the access to audiences issue has arisen.
The question of a right of access to audiences arose most explicitly in a decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressing the issue of whether broadcasters had the right to 
“channel” political advertisements deemed potentially harmful to children to late-night hours, in light of 
Garon, Media and Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 613 (1999): “Notwithstanding the Court’s reluctance to monitor the outcome of 
the exercise of free expression, it must remain cognizant that failure to provide a minimal opportunity for 
widespread participation will result in the shrinking and eventual elimination of the marketplace” (emphasis added).
119
 Michael J. Burstein, Toward a New Standard of First Amendment Review of Structural Media Regulation, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1060 (2004).
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the FCC’s “reasonable access” provisions, which require equal access to broadcast facilities for all legally 
qualified candidates.120  In this case, the issue involved whether the channeling of an advertisement 
containing graphic abortion footage constituted a violation of the reasonable access provisions.121  The 
petitioner, Daniel Becker, argued that the reasonable access provisions do not “permit a licensee to deny a 
candidate access to adult audiences of his choice merely because significant numbers of children may also 
be watching television.”122  In overturning the Commission’s decision to allow the channeling of political 
advertisements, the court noted that any channeling denied a candidate “his statutory right of ‘access to 
the time periods with the greatest audience potential.’”123 The court also went beyond the issue of general 
audience reach, noting that “while it is possible to visualize accommodations at the margin in which a 
political message is broadcast during school hours or the late, late evening when significantly fewer 
children are watching television, any such accommodation is apt to deprive a candidate of particular 
categories of adult viewers whom he may be especially anxious to reach. . . Thus, the ruling creates a 
situation where a candidate’s ability to reach his target audience may be limited.”124  Thus, the court 
interpreted the reasonable access provisions as granting political candidates the right to reach specific 
audience segments.  However, it is important to note that the court reached its conclusions only via 
assessing the extent to which the Commission’s decision to allow channeling violated the language of the 
reasonable access provisions, declining “to address Mr. Becker’s argument that channeling a candidate’s 
campaign advertisement violates the candidate’s First Amendment rights.”125  In this regard, this decision 
perpetuates the tendency to ignore or neglect the role of the First Amendment right of access to audiences 
in electronic media policy.
120
 Becker v. Federal Communications Commission, 95 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
121
 For detailed discussions of this case, see Lili Levi, The FCC, Indecency, and Anti-Abortion Political Advertising, 
3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 85 (1996); Milagros Rivera-Sanchez and Paul H. Gates, Jr., Abortion on the Air: 
Broadcasters and Indecent Political Advertising, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 267 (1994).
122 Id. at 79.
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 Id. at 80 (citations omitted).
124 Id. at 80.
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One of the more extensive discussions of the relationship between the First Amendment and 
access to audiences within an electronic media context can be found in the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Warner Cable Communications v. City of Niceville.126  In this decision, the 
court rejected Warner Cable’s claim that the city of Niceville’s plan to establish a government owned-and 
-operated cable system to compete with Warner Cable’s incumbent system was a violation of Warner 
Cable’s First Amendment rights. According to the court:
We agree that the government may not speak so loudly as to make it impossible for other 
speakers to be heard by their audience.  The government would then be preventing the 
speakers’ access to that audience, and first amendment concerns would arise.  For 
instance, if a city government builds a better soapbox, equipped with spotlights and 
powerful loudspeakers, next to the longstanding antique soapbox in the city square, and if 
government speakers dominate the new soapbox, then speakers on the first soapbox do 
not truly have the opportunity to communicate their views even to those who might wish 
to hear them.  The city would then be ‘drowning out’ the voice of the private speakers.  
But if the soapboxes are equal and the city speakers simply attract more listeners because 
the listeners prefer the city’s message, there is no ‘drowning out,’ no denial of access, 
and no first amendment violation. . . . the speaker on the first soapbox cannot demand to 
monopolize the information-seeking audience in the name of the first amendment.127
This passage makes the important point that communications technologies can be used to “monopolize 
the information-seeking audience”128 in such a way that other speakers’ First Amendment rights of access 
to audiences may be affected.  According to this passage, there needs to be some effort towards fairness 
and equity in the distribution of access to audiences. 
126
 911 F.2d 634 (1990) (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 638.
128 Id.
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The issue of a First Amendment right of access to audiences arose more recently in the Supreme 
Court’s upholding of the FCC’s cable television must-carry rules.129  In assessing the constitutionality of 
the must-carry rules, the Court assessed the extent to which the rules denied individual cable networks 
access to audiences.  One of the plaintiff’s primary arguments was that the must carry rules make it more 
difficult for cable programmers to achieve carriage on cable systems – essentially, making it more 
difficult for them to gain access to television audiences.  As Justice Breyer noted in his concurring 
statement, the must-carry rules prevent “displaced cable program providers from obtaining an audience,” 
which amounts to “a suppression of speech.”130  However, citing evidence that 99.8 percent of all cable 
programming carried before the enactment of the must-carry rules was carried after the enactment of the 
rules, the Court concluded that the must-carry rules did not violate the First Amendment, in part due to 
the fact that denials of access to audiences were minimal.131  This decision, then, not only suggests that 
consideration of a speaker’s right of access to audiences is appropriate in the realm of media policy, but 
also that some infringement on certain speakers’ abilities to access audiences is permissible from a First 
Amendment standpoint in order to improve other speakers’ (in this case, broadcasters’) level of access to 
audiences.
A number of important points can be gleaned from these cases.  First, as the Warner Cable
decision indicated, monopolies in the context of access to audiences raise significant First Amendment 
concerns.  Given that, as was illustrated previously, access to audiences and access to the media are not 
synonymous, policymakers need to remain sensitive to the possibility of monopolies (or near monopolies) 
in access to audiences arising even in instances when there may not be monopolies, or near monopolies, 
in access to the media.  As the court noted, a speaker “cannot demand to monopolize the information-
seeking audience in the name of the first amendment.”132 From an access to audiences standpoint, 
129 Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. 180.
130 Id. at 226.
131 Id. at 214.
132 See supra note 126.
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policymakers must be more sensitive to the various mechanisms that can produce monopolies in the area 
of access to audiences, such as characteristics of the distribution process or technologies, that can produce 
significant inequalities in the level of access to audiences, even when access to media outlets appears 
fairly equitable.  
The more finely nuanced access to audiences concept raises the inevitable possibility that the 
application of access to the media criterion does not meet standards established by the access to audiences 
criterion.  A focus purely on the issue of access to the media “ignores . . . the problem of audience access.  
No provision is made to ensure that speakers have a meaningful opportunity to reach an audience.”133
Thus, an approach that focuses more intently on the concept of access to audiences ultimately could be 
more demanding, from a First Amendment standpoint. 
In this regard, when policy-makers engage in their increasingly common practice of reciting an 
exhaustive list of media outlets and sources that are available as evidence of a media environment that 
well-serves the underlying values of the First Amendment, they may operating under an overly simplistic 
notion of the extent to which the First Amendment right of access to audiences is being well-served.  For 
instance, the Federal Communications Commission began its Notice of Proposed Rule Making 
announcing a reconsideration of the broadcast station/newspaper cross-ownership rules by stating:
The Commission first adopted the rule in 1975, when there were approximately 1,700 
daily newspapers, 7,500 radio stations, and fewer than 1,000 TV stations.  Three national 
commercial broadcast networks had a combined prime time audience share of 95%.  
Today, the multimedia environment in which broadcast stations and newspapers operate is 
significantly different.  Although there are now fewer than 1,500 daily newspapers, there 
are not only many more broadcast stations, but also wholly new programming networks 
and distribution platforms.  There are more than 12,000 radio stations, and more than 
1,600 full-power TV stations.  Commercial TV stations distribute the programming of 
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seven national commercial networks, and cable television systems and satellite carriers 
distribute multiples of that number.  In the current 2000-2001 TV season just completed, 
the four largest broadcast networks have a combined prime time audience share of 50% 
and basic cable networks have a combined prime time audience share of 42%.134
This description certainly provides an important indication of the extent to which the media environment 
has changed and the opportunities for access to the media have increased.  However, such a description 
represents only the most rudimentary level of analysis in terms of determining the distribution of the right 
of access to audiences, the extent to which the contours of the contemporary media environment are 
fulfilling their potential to facilitate widespread access to audiences, and whether policy remedies to 
improve the situation may be needed.  Consider, for instance, the argument of J.M. Balkin, who notes 
that, 
Communication is scarce . . . in the sense that there is only so much available audience time to go 
around.  Although newer technologies like the mass media can reach more people more quickly, 
they still do not eliminate this . . . type of scarcity.  Indeed, mass communication only increases 
competition for audience attention. . . . In an earlier age, it may have seemed that there was a 
plentitude of listeners, and audience scarcity was not a real phenomenon.  With the advent of 
mass media, however, we see all the more urgently that speech rights can come into conflict not 
only with the property rights of others, but also with the speech rights of others.135
From this standpoint, to what extent does the FCC’s recitation of the range of available communications 
channels represent any kind of meaningful analysis of the relative effectiveness of each channel as 
alternative means of reaching the audiences reached via the most powerful media outlets?  How do these 
different means of communication compare in regards to criteria such as the scope of their audience 
133
 Zatz, supra note 11 at 189.
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 In re cross-ownership of broadcast stations and newspapers; newspaper/radio cross-ownership waiver policy, see 
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reach; their ability to reach a speaker’s desired audience; the costs associated with reaching desired 
audiences; and the autonomy from gatekeepers provided?  All of these criteria have been explicitly raised 
in contexts dealing with a speaker’s right of access to audiences, and therefore should be central to the 
analysis and formulation of media policy.  Moreover, this type of analytical framework utilized by the 
FCC perpetuates the troubling tendency amongst policymakers to assess the extent to which the 
contemporary media landscape effectively serves First Amendment values against past conditions, rather 
than against the contemporary environment’s full potential to serve First Amendment values.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Turner suggests that policies that reduce the levels of access to 
audiences for some speakers may be constitutional.  In upholding the must-carry rules, the Court 
acknowledged that some speakers (i.e., cable networks), would have their level of access to audiences 
reduced due to their diminished cable carriage, but that such a reduction was acceptable in light of the 
benefits that that the must-carry rules brought to viewers in the form of a greater diversity of sources of 
information and in the form of local sources and information.  In this regard, the arguments and analysis 
surrounding the Turner decision follow precedent in that there was very little focus on the extent to which 
the must-carry rules potentially promoted the First Amendment rights of speakers, only on the extent to 
which they potentially promoted the First Amendment rights of audiences.136  Concerns regarding 
broadcasters’ access to audiences were considered primarily from an economic standpoint (i.e., the 
possible economic harms that could come from reduced audience reach) rather than from a First 
Amendment standpoint.  Conceivably the arguments and analysis could have focused instead on (or at 
least given equal prominence to) the issue of the First Amendment rights of speakers from an affirmative 
standpoint – and the extent to which monopolies in local cable markets potentially infringed on the First 
Amendment rights of broadcasters by limiting their access to audiences. 
135
 J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, DUKE L.J. 375, 
at 408-409 (1990).
136
 See Justice Breyer’s concurring statement for a discussion of the collectivist First Amendment values served by 
the must-carry decision, infra note 154 at 225-226.
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Applying an access to audiences analytical framework provides a distinctive interpretive lens for 
other media policy areas as well.  Consider, for instance, policies such as multiple- or cross-ownership 
restrictions or license allocation preferences.  Ownership restrictions, for instance, can be thought of as 
restrictions on the access to audiences for certain speakers in order to promote access to audiences for 
other speakers. The Supreme Court has upheld ownership restrictions as constitutional,137 but in so 
doing, did not directly address the access to audiences issue.  Instead, the Court relied on the unique 
characteristics of the broadcast spectrum, noting that “there is no unabridgeable First Amendment right to 
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”138 The Court also 
invoked the unique nature of broadcasting to refute the argument that “the government may [not] restrict 
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.”139  This 
perspective suggests that, in the realm of electronic media policymaking, consideration for the 
distribution of speech rights is appropriate.
Nonetheless, in Fox Television Stations Inc. v. FCC,140 the broadcast networks contended that the 
national audience reach cap limiting television station ownership represented an infringement on their 
First Amendment rights – essentially, a government-imposed infringement on their right of access to 
audiences.  The networks opposing the limit argued that their First Amendment right to directly access 
every television viewer in the United States was being violated.141  To the extent that a significant 
137 See Federal Communications Commission v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 
(1978) (upholding the FCC’s local newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership limits).
138 Id. at 799, quoting Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit responded similarly to Sinclair Broadcasting’s First Amendment 
argument against the FCC’s local television station ownership limit, in which Sinclair claimed that the 
Commission’s “eight voices” test represented “an overly broad restriction on television broadcasters’ right to 
speak,” Sinclair Broadcast Group v. Federal Communications Commission, 284 F.3d 148, 168-169 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
In contrast, the court devoted virtually no attention to Time Warner’s First Amendment arguments against the cable 
horizontal and vertical ownership limits in its decision to reverse and remand those limits, Time Warner v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 240 F.3d 1126 (2001).
139 Supra Nicevill, 911 F.2d 634, 799, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
140
 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
141 Id. at 1045. “The networks contend that the NTSO Rule violates the First Amendment because it prevents them 
from speaking directly – that is through the stations they own and operate – to 65% of the potential television 
audience in the United States.”
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relaxation of the ownership rules would facilitate a tremendous level of access to audiences to a very 
small number of speakers, the question inevitably arises as to whether such a policy decision is in keeping 
with the First Amendment.142   If we consider the First Amendment right of access to audiences as a right 
that media policymakers should promote in the same way that they have acknowledge the need to 
promote a right of access to the media, then the claims of an infringement on their right of access to 
audiences articulated by the broadcast networks pale alongside those of the speakers whose ability to 
reach audiences will be curtailed by the concentration of station ownership (and audience access) 
facilitated by the relaxation or elimination of the ownership cap.  As the Supreme Court noted in the Red 
Lion decision, “as far as the First Amendment is concerned, those who are licensed stand no better than 
those to whom licenses are refused.”143 If indeed promoting the right of access to audiences is something 
that media policymakers should consider as a policy goal, it becomes difficult to justify that it is a right 
that accrue so disproportionately to a select few speakers.
Although the court did not find that the ownership cap violated the First Amendment,144 the court 
reached this decision without being confronted with the argument that the cap was motivated in part by 
the desire to promote speakers’ First Amendment rights, by preventing further distortion in the allocation 
of speakers’ rights of access to audiences. To the extent that a relaxed national audience reach cap 
facilitates greater inequality in terms of the distribution of speakers’ level of access to audiences, there is 
a speaker-based First Amendment argument that actually runs counter to the First Amendment argument 
posed by those opposed to the cap.  
Similarly, license allocation preferences (such as the now-defunct minority and gender broadcast 
licensing preferences145) could be thought of as increasing the level of access to audiences for certain 
142 See supra note 116.
143
 Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
144 Id. at 1045-1046.
145 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), in which the 
Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s minority preference in the allocation of broadcast licenses.  See Lamprecht v. 
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categories of speakers – though such a preference necessarily reduces other categories of speakers’ 
abilities to reach audiences.  Certainly, the key question that arises from this approach involves when –
and to what extent – is it appropriate to restrict some speakers’ access to audiences in the name of 
preserving or promoting other speakers’ access to audiences?146  The courts have not, at this point, 
provided clear and explicit guidance to policymakers in terms of when and to what extent such denials of 
access are permissible.147  However, it would appear that such denials of access to audiences can 
potentially survive judicial scrutiny.
What is particularly interesting is that policies that have reduced certain speakers’ levels of access 
to audiences have, in some instances, survived First Amendment scrutiny despite the fact that potentially 
the most powerful argument on their behalf has been largely neglected.  As was illustrated above, the 
concept of a right of access to the media generally has been developed and applied with an emphasis on 
the benefits that accrue to viewers or listeners from the granting of such access rights.148  Thus, a right of 
media access generally has been premised more on the First Amendment rights of viewers/listeners than it 
has upon the First Amendment rights of speakers.  This history of justifying a speaker’s right of access to 
the media in terms of collectivist values weakens such access policies from a First Amendment 
standpoint.  This is due largely to the fact that the collectivist interpretation of the First Amendment is not 
Federal Communications Commission, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) for a decision overturning the FCC’s gender 
preference in the allocation of broadcast licenses.
146
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as widely accepted within the courts as the individualist approach.149  Post has gone so far as to describe 
the Supreme Court as “largely hostile”150 to collectivist First Amendment interpretations.  Individualist 
First Amendment interpretations generally are seen as much more widely accepted within the judiciary. 151
The practical reality, then, is that policies that are justified on the basis of maximizing citizens’ rights of 
access to diverse sources and content often cannot withstand the scrutiny of an individualist First 
Amendment interpretation – one in which the rights of the speaker are paramount.  
Consider, for instance, Latera v. Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Association, in which the 
homeowners association’s prohibition against residents installing satellite dishes was upheld.152  The 
initial (and, in this case, unsuccessful) rhetorical response against such a prohibition was to assert that 
audiences are being denied access to speech to which they have a constitutional right.153  However, such 
an approach “ignores the rights of persons outside a residential association to communication with those 
inside.”154  Perhaps arguments that emphasize the denials of these speakers’ rights of access to the 
audiences within the area governed by the homeowners association would achieve stronger First 
Amendment traction with the courts than arguments that emphasize the denials of the audience’s rights of 
access to the content being provided by the satellite services.
149 See S. Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: the First Amendment in Institutional 
Contexts, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1990); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of 
Public Discourse, 63 UNIV. OF COLORADO L. REV. 1109 (1993).
150
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with certain highly favored categories of individual behavior (like political speech …).  Viewed solely as a means of 
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insulating private activity from regulation despite its deleterious effect on democracy,” Burt Neuborne, Toward a 
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Too often, advocates of increased structural regulation of the media industries have emphasized 
that, in such cases, “there are legitimate speech interests on both sides of the dispute,”155 but then have
unfortunately explicated the speech interests on one side of the dispute (the side opposing government 
regulation) being those of the speaker and those on the other side of the dispute (the side advocating 
government regulation) being those of the audience.156  Such a characterization actually under-represents 
the relevant speech interests on the pro-regulation side of the dispute, as it neglects the interests of those 
speakers whose access to audiences would be facilitated or perhaps enhanced by the structural regulation 
at issue.
From a rhetorical strategy standpoint, those policies that do in fact improve citizens’ access to 
diverse sources need not be justified or defended primarily on the basis of their ability to serve the 
collectivist functions of the First Amendment, as has been the traditional strategic approach.157  Rather, 
such policies can (and should) legitimately be interpreted as preserving and promoting the individual 
liberties that are at the core the more widely accepted individualist interpretation of the First Amendment, 
given the extent to which they promote a speaker’s First Amendment right of access to audiences.  In this 
regard, then, such policies could be seen as doubly effective from a First Amendment standpoint, in that 
they directly serve both individualist and collectivist First Amendment values.  In the end, adopting a 
rhetorical approach that extends beyond collectivist values that have become associated with the access to 
the media concept and more fully embraces individualistic values associated with the access to audiences 
155
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concept ultimately could strengthen the defensibility of any speaker access policies from a First 
Amendment standpoint.  
Moreover, such an approach would allow for an expansion beyond the traditional contexts in 
which a right of “access to the media” has been advocated.  That is, in most of the most significant 
“access to the media” cases, what has been advocated is the right of a speaker to temporarily control 
another speaker’s means of communication.158  In granting an individual temporary access to a media 
outlet to deliver his/her message, the voice of the owner of that outlet is, for that time period, silenced.  In 
contrast, in the access to audience cases discussed above, the granting of a speaker or group of speakers 
access to an audience does not require that they gain temporary, complete control of a communications 
mechanism owned by another speaker, only that an speech environment be created in which the ideas of 
multiple speakers can then potentially circulate.159  Translating this latter perspective to the mediated 
environment would mean focusing less on the issue of speaker access to the media outlets owned by 
others (i.e., media outlets as pseudo common carriers) and more on creating a speech/media environment 
in which speakers have access to audiences (i.e., a more competitive, diversified media system).   This is 
the perspective that underlies the public forum doctrine (i.e., creating public spaces for expression, 
deliberation, and debate among many speakers) and that underlies the alternative means of 
communication component of the time, place, manner test (i.e., to what extent does the speech 
environment facilitate the exercise of the speaker’s First Amendment rights?), and to Balkin’s notion of 
the First Amendment imperative for the creation of a democratic culture.160  A right of access to 
audiences perspective, when applied to the mediated environment, should move beyond the right of 
access to another speaker’s media outlet, and encompass the more wide-ranging objective of crafting a 
158 See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. 367.
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media system in which the right of access to audiences is widely distributed.  In this regard, the right of 
access to audiences can – and should – be employed directly on behalf of structural regulation of the 
media.
If such an approach to the notion of the right of access to audiences were not taken, however, or 
not accepted by policymakers and the courts, then the First Amendment may compel a more rigorous 
pursuit of Fairness Doctrine-like policies that grant unaffiliated speakers temporary access to privately 
held media outlets.  To the extent that increased ownership concentration leads to greater inequities in the 
allocation of audience access rights, perhaps this scenario should be seen as compelling policymakers to, 
if not address the concentration issue directly, then to respond with policies that counteract the First 
Amendment harms of such concentration (in terms of diminished equality in access to audiences) by 
treating these outlets, and the audiences to which they have access, as resources to be shared with a 
greater portion of the citizenry, in much the same way that the migration of the citizenry from public 
streets to privately held shopping centers has justified the clear imposition of the public forum doctrine to 
these private spaces.  This of course brings us back to Barron’s original contention – that the migration of 
public discourse and debate to the mediated sphere, combined with the increased privatization and 
concentration of ownership within this sphere – compels policies that treat private media outlets more like
public forums,161 an argument that the courts have largely remained hesitant to embrace.162 Perhaps a 
return to this argument that is more firmly grounded in the First Amendment access rights of speakers, 
and, consequently, the individualist First Amendment values that are at the core of traditional First 
Amendment jurisprudence, would strengthen future iterations of this policy argument.
160 See Balkin, supra note 108.
161 See supra note 55.
162 See Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that newspapers need not be operated as a public 
forum); United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194, 216-18 (2003) (plurality) (holding that the 
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Conclusion
“Much of the complexity and uncertainty in First Amendment doctrine stems from the reality that 
any comprehensive theory of free speech must cover not only speakers, but listeners as well.”163 In the 
electronic media realm, certainly the listeners have received substantial attention and their rights have 
been well-articulated.  However, this paper has suggested that the emphasis on listeners’ rights that is at 
the core of the right of access to the media that is unique to the electronic media realm, has stunted the
development of a potentially more important, more robust, and more rhetorically effective First 
Amendment right, that of the right of access to audiences – the right of the speaker to reach listeners.
The differences between a First Amendment right of access to the media and a First Amendment 
right of access to audiences are significant ones.  This paper represents a starting point in exploring the 
full extent of these differences.  This paper has illustrated how the First Amendment right of access to 
audiences is the more sensitive and analytically rigorous standard, and is in fact the standard more firmly 
grounded in traditional First Amendment values.  For these reasons, to the extent that the concept of a 
First Amendment right of access to the media has been the predominant guiding First Amendment access 
right in media regulation and policy, and to the extent that this right has been premised primarily upon 
collectivist First Amendment values, neither the policy-makers nor the courts, nor, for that matter, the 
public interest/advocacy community, have been bringing the full force of the First Amendment to bear on 
their analyses and decision-making.  
The application of this right of access to audiences in mediated communication contexts can –
and should – be premised upon traditional First Amendment notions of individualistic free speech values, 
as opposed to (or at least in addition to) collectivist values.  Certainly, preserving and promoting 
speakers’ First Amendment rights of access to audiences likely would simultaneously serve collectivist 
First Amendment values.  In this regard, the right of access to audiences may be one of the most powerful 
rights inherent in the First Amendment, in terms of its ability to fulfill a wide range of the underlying 
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values of freedom of speech.
163 See Note: The Impermeable Life, supra note 51 at 1314-1315.
